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Abstract 
In four experiments we asked consumers to suggest a new fair price for a 
firm that has experienced an increase in production costs. For non-
subsidized firms, subjects reason according to the principles of 
distributive justice, disconfirming the predictions based on the dual 
entitlement principle. When the firm is subsidized, the dual entitlement 
principle is supported. Follow-up studies suggest that the dual 
entitlement effect for subsidized firms is limited to (1) situations in which 
respondents are impartial observers, rather than the firm's own 
customers, (2) situations where the stakeholders are affected in their long 
term (tax-payer) interests, or (3) situations in which customers do 
identify strongly with the objectives of the subsidized company. 
Introduction 
In recent years, consumer researchers have paid increasing attention to consumer 
fair price judgments in their reactions to price changes. Many studies have found 
that consumers react negatively to a supplier's exploitation of market power. Price 
increases are considered unfair when they are not justified by a corresponding 
increase in costs (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986a,b; Campbell 1999). 
Consumers are also often unwilling to pay a price that is perceived as unfair (Urbany, 
Madden, and Dickson 1989), and may even lead to retiliatory customer behavior 
(Frey and Pommerehe 1993; Kachelmeier et al. 1991; Piron and Fernandez 1995). 
Moreover, there is some evidence that real-life pricing decisions do take consumer 
price fairness judgments into consideration. For instance, Olmstead and Rhode 
(1985) documented decisions by individual gasoline sellers not to increase price even 
in the absence of any immediate threat to future custom or threat of regulation. 
Similarly, Blinder (1991) noted that 61 % of marketing executives considered the 
fairness constraint to be one of the most important reasons why sellers would not 
raise prices. 
Here, we investigate how fair price judgments are affected by consumer 
knowledge of government sponsoring. In many markets, goods and services are 
provided to consumers by government or government-sponsored organizations in 
partial competition with profit-oriented firms (e.g., education, public transportation, 
student restaurants, health services, etc). For example, the 10% of public schools in 
US that offer the most generous subsidies actually subsidize 94.5% of the total cost 
of producing their students' education. The most generous 10% of private 
institutions subsidize 75.3% of their students' education (Winson and Yen 1995). 
The pricing policies of government sponsored firms are interesting because they are 
assumed to serve a social welfare goal. If they are operating in a market together 
with private firms, the subsidies allow them to price at the low end of the market. At 
the same time they are dependent on tax-payers' money, and the public requests 
accountability. Some prior research suggests that governments may be held to a 
more strict fairness standard than profit-oriented firms. For instance, they are less 
entitled than profit oriented firms to exploit market power (Frey and Pommerehe 
1993). We want to expand on their findings, and explore how price changes are 
evaluated in more mundane (non-exploitative) situations. 
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Price fairness judgments 
In attempt to explain price fairness judgment phenomena, Kahneman, Knetsch, 
and Thaler (1986a,b) in two influential papers proposed "dual entitlement" as the 
dominant norm of price fairness. They stated that buyers and sellers each recognize 
each other's entitlement according to the terms of some reference transaction -
buyers to a reference price, sellers to a reference profit. Consumers use reference 
price as an anchor point to evaluate own gains and losses, and they use their 
knowledge about the firm's reference profit to evaluate the gains and losses of the 
transaction counterpart. According to the dual entitlement principle, a price increase, 
which violates the buyer's entitlement to the reference price, will be considered 
acceptable only if it perceived to be necessary to protect the seller's reference profit. 
This implies that a price increase that increases the seller's profit beyond its 
reference entitlement will be deemed unfair. According to the dual entitlement 
principle, it is considered fair if the company completely compensates its cost 
lllcrease. It is also consistent with fairness norms not to pass cost decreases to the 
customer, since, in this case the seller's profit increases without violating the buyer's 
reference price entitlement. 
A number of subsequent studies which concentrated both on outcomes and price 
setting rules have added to and refined these basic findings. Some research has 
found support for the role of reference profit in perception of fairness (Kachelmeier 
et al. 1991; Campbell 1999). Those findings report that price changes are 
consistently considered unfair when subjects attributed the price increase to a firm's 
attempt to take advantage of sudden demand increase (Kalapurakal et al. 1991 ; 
Kachelmeier et al. 1991; Piron and Fernandez 1995). In the situations when the 
same price increase occurred as a compensation for the increase of the firm's costs, 
the same practice becomes fair and accepted by a majority of respondents 
(Kahneman et al. 1986a; Frey and Pommerehe 1993). 
The reported research results suggest that customers are sensitive not only to a 
company's reference profit but also to a reference pricing rule which generates this 
profit. Traditionally, the fair price has been conceptualized as based on cost rather 
than on demand (Okun 1981). Some economic models also suggest that the fair 
price may be based on consumer's expectations of the product cost to the seller 
(Glazer 1984). In general, economics assumes that perceived prices govern 
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consumer choices among products. Demand converges to the lowest supplier price 
for an identical good. Thus fairness is not an issue in a competitive market, which by 
definition will not support super-normal profits. Here we take a different 
perspective. We assume that consumers' fairness rules are cost-based for a number 
of reasons. First, consumers may consider many cost factors including cost of time, 
uncertainty about competitors, search effort and so on. They may be faced with a 
price that minimizes their total cost but is still considered unfair. Second, once 
initiated, supplier-customer interactions have many features of a monopoly. For 
instance, consumers often choose a supplier before knowing anything about prices. 
They also may be locked into such relationships either by contract or 
psychologically, which makes it hard to compare prices between suppliers. Status 
quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988), sunk cost bias (Arkes and Blumer 
1985), brand loyalty or mere habit (Muthukrishnan 1995) may create quasi-
monopolistic relationships between firm and customer. In this situation, inferences 
about supplier's costs start to play an important role in the determination of the 
customer reference price and eventually affect price fairness judgments. 
Empirical evidence supports these findings (Kahneman et al. 1986a; Kalapurakal 
et al. 1991; Dickson and Kalapurakal 1994; Seligman and Schwartz 1997; 
Kachelmeier et al. 1991; Piron and Fernandez 1995). First, in comparison of other 
price setting rules, the cost-based pricing rule was found to be fair in all price 
fairness studies. Second, the cost-based fairness rule implies consumer knowledge of 
company profit and, hence, the knowledge of company's costs is an important factor 
in price fairness judgments. Several studies (Kahnemann et al. 1986a,b; Campbell 
1999) have confirmed the critical role of the inferred profit (and, therefore, supplier 
costs) in those situations. Obviously, the company's cost is not the only possible 
reference point for price fairness judgments. In competitive situations other 
reference points are equally likely (for example a competitor's price). However, 
several price researchers stress the seller's cost as a very important component of 
consumer price fairness judgments. According to Thaler (1985), "the most important 
factor in determining the reference price is fairness. Fairness, in turn, depends in 
large part on cost to the seller" (p. 205). Nagle and Holden (1995) also notice that 
"one way buyers infer fairness is to assess what it costs sellers to deliver the product" 
(p. 309). 
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The research results also indicate that the least fair pricing rule is the one based on 
supplier exploitation of a sudden demand increase (Kalapurakal et al 1991). The 
relative fairness perception of different cost-based rules has also been examined in a 
number of studies. Some of them support the dual entitlement principle (Kahneman 
et al. 1986a, b), but others present evidence for the greater perceived fairness of rules 
based on a more symmetric treatment of cost increases and decreases (Kalapurakal et 
al. 1991; Dickson and KalapurakaI1994). 
Until now, almost all price fairness studies have concentrated exclusively on 
private firms as the object of research. There is an important uninvestigated area 
concerning consumer price fairness judgments related to subsidized companies. In 
addition, the vast majority of studies concentrate on fairness judgments in situations 
of only one potential price change - a price increase. Clearly, in such cases the 
fairness concern is likely to be most salient for buyers and sellers. However, in some 
cases, price decreases by a company can also be considered unfair and eventually 
influence consumer behavior. For instance, this may happen in situations where 
price decreases are considered insufficiently deep (e.g., when the customer infers that 
costs have decreased even more). Another example is a company's reluctance to 
decrease the price in the absence of strong competition, which becomes apparent 
later, after new competitors have entered the market. In both situations the 
relationships (trust) between company and its consumers may deteriorate. 
Third, the dual entitlement principle is presented in the current research literature 
as the dominant principle for price fairness judgments. It implies that company is 
allowed to increase price to completely compensate its costs increase, but can keep a 
share of benefits when costs decrease. This principle describes a consumer as a 
spontaneously altruistic person. This idea does not look very intuitive and requires 
further exploration. For instance, the findings of Kalapurakal (Kalapurakal et al. 
1991; Kalapurakal and Dickson 1994) have shown that in some situations other 
principles are considered as being fairer than dual entitlement. So, the question 
remains how contextual factors affect the principles people use in their price fairness 
judgments. 
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Figure 1. Theoretical patterns of price 
fairness judgments principles 
In Fig. 1, we present a framework which summarizes the principles consumers 
may use when determining the fairness of price changes. When costs change, the 
consumers will infer the new fair price on the basis of their judgments about profit 
the company is entitled to make. In other words, consumers make normative 
judgments about the supplier absorption rate - the share of cost change the company 
should (or is allowed to) keep. For instance, when unit costs increase by 30 BEF, 
there are several options. First, the firm may be allowed to fully compensate its cost 
increase by setting a new price 30 BEF higher than the old one. This situation 
implies a zero absorption rate. Second, for some reasons it may not be considered 
fair for the firm to compensate its cost increase and to increase the price. In this case 
the absorbed amount will be maximal and equal to 30 BEF. Third, the company may 
be granted the partial compensation of cost increase, which leads to different values 
of absorption levels between 0 BEF and 30 BEF. The same situations may occur 
when costs go down. The fairness norms may require a company to decrease its 
price following the cost decrease (zero absorption rate). Alternatively, the company 
is allowed to keep all extra profits and keep the price at the old level (maximum 
absorption rate), or transfer some benefits to consumers (absorption rate is between 
zero and maximum value). 
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The combination of both cost increase and decrease results in an overall set of 
price fairness principles which people may use when seller's costs change (Figure 1). 
The first principle is symmetric and based on the distributive justice principle of 
equity (line (a)): suppliers ought to grant the customer a share in both the burden of a 
cost increase and the pleasure of a cost decrease (see Novose1tsev, 2000). This 
principle implies equal absorption rates, independent of whether the cost change is an 
increase or a decrease. At the extremes, this principle will translate in a 'buffering' 
rule, when all cost changes are absorbed by the supplier (absorption rate is 
maximum), or in a cost-plus rule when all changes are transferred to the consumer 
(absorption rate is zero). Several intermediate rules may be thought of, depending on 
the proportion of the cost change which is absorbed or transferred, but they are all 
symmetric because the absorption rate is the same for cost increases and cost 
decreases. 
Two alternative principles may be asymmetric. According to the first asymmetric 
principle the supplier should absorb all cost increases, but transfer all cost decreases 
to the customers (line (b)). From the customer perspective this principle implies self-
interest motivation. Consumers require the company to decrease the price when 
costs go down. At the same time consumers protect their interests and do not allow 
the company to increase the price in order to compensate its cost increase. The 
second asymmetric principle suggests that the supplier is permitted to increase price 
whenever it is justified by a cost increase but is allowed to keep a share of benefits 
when supplier costs decrease (line (c)). This situation reflects the altruistic 
motivation of consumers assumed in the dual entitlement principle. Instead of 
sharing benefits and burdens consumers allow company to benefit out of both 
situations of cost increase and decrease. 
Absorption rates for cost increase and cost decrease situations are two 
characteristics which help to distinguish one principle from another. Identical 
absorption rates describe the symmetrical price fairness judgment pattern. When the 
absorption rates are different, they imply either a self-interest principle or an 
altruistic principle. 
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Consumer fair price judgments for subsidized companies 
The three presented principles are based on three different norms or motives 
which individuals may use in their price fairness judgments. Those norms are based 
on justice, altruism and self-interest motives, respectively. 
The economic literature suggests a number of factors which may lead to the 
arousal of consumer altruistic motivation for subsidized companies. These factors 
include a sense of civic duty (Katosh and Traugott 1982), public-regard (Wilson and 
Banfield 1964), and concerns about justice (Tyler et al. 1985, Deutsch, 1975; 
Leventhal, 1976). Rasinski and Rosenbaum state (1987, p. 992), "In fact, .. 
research suggests that the citizen's sense of public responsibility may completely 
overcome his or her own self-interest when making decisions about public services 
and the funding of such services". Additionally, Rasinsky and Tyler (1986) found 
that non-self-interested factors (e.g. concern for the quality of education and 
sympathy with teachers over low salaries) carried more weight in predicting 
hypothetical support for subsidies increase than did self-interest. The authors point 
out the consistency of these findings with prior work showing strong public support 
for policies that benefit the general social welfare. Finally, in their analysis of the 
content of many subsidized companies' appeals, Berkowitz and Daniels (1963) found 
that assertion of dependency was very common instrument used to generate a 
consumer support. The perception of a dependent relationship is assumed to arouse 
feelings of responsibility to others and to increase willingness to behave altruistically 
towards these others (Berkowitz and Daniels 1963). 
In the current studies we test the hypotheses that (1) subsidized companies are 
subject to different consumer price fairness judgments than their non-subsidized 
counterparts; and (2) those judgments follow the altruistic (dual entitlement) pattern 
which implies a low absorption rate for costs increase and a high absorption rate for 
costs decrease situations. Below we report three lab experiments and one field study 
examining the fairness principles consumers apply to government sponsored firms' 
price change decisions. 
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Study 1: Judgment of fair price in the presence of subsidies. 
In Study 1, we studied how the presence of information about subsidies influences 
the pattern of price fairness judgments. We used a classic 'vignette' paradigm, 
described below. 
Subjects and procedure. 
One hundred eighty two undergraduate students from a Dutch-speaking Belgian 
university participated in the study as part of a course requirement for an 
undergraduate business class. They were asked to participate in a short survey 
related to pricing policies of firms. The experiment was held at the start of a regular 
class lecture. The subjects were asked to carefully read a paragraph containing the 
experimental manipulations, and to answer the question about the new fair price the 
company should set. No other measures were taken. After five minutes all 
questionnaires were returned back to the administrator. 
Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to the cells in 2x2x2 factorial between 
subj ects design. Each of the eight cells corresponded with a different version of the 
same basic scenario, describing a firm confronted with a specific change in unit costs 
for its service (30 Belgian Francs (BEF)). We manipulated whether the scenario 
mentioned an increase or an equivalent decrease in costs, and whether or not the firm 
was sponsored by the federal government. Financial information about the 
government sponsored firm was constructed such that the current costs was identical 
to that of the non-sponsored firm (150 BEF). The price charged by the non-
sponsored firm was 180 BEF and its profit therefore was 30 BEF. The sponsored 
firm charged 120 BEF and received 30 BEF worth of subsidies per unit sold. Two 
replications were used: in one set of scenarios the firm was a student restaurant; in a 
second set it was a guided tourist bus ride through a medieval city center. In both 
cases the companies were said to be located in a different town than where data were 
collected. Subjects were asked what would be a fair new price for the service. The 
dependent variable was the absolute difference between the current price and the new 
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fair price. An example of the scenario is presented in Appendix A (the subsidized 
firm-cost increase-tourist ride' cell ofthe design). 
Results. 
********************************** 
INSERT FIG 2 ABOUT HERE 
********************************** 
There was no main effect nor any interaction involving the scenario factor, which 
is therefore omitted from the further description of the results. Figure 2 shows a 
strong interaction effect between the presence of information about government 
sponsorship and the direction ofthe cost change (F(l, 178) = 13.53; p< .001). Profit-
oriented firms were subjected to a distributive justice rule, closely resembling a cost-
plus rule. The slope of the line is not significantly different from zero (F(l, 178) = 
1.06; p<0.3 ). Most of the cost change could be transferred to the customer, but the 
proportion did not differ between cost increases and decreases. For the subsidized 
firm, the pattern of results closely resembled the dual entitlement rule. In this case, 
the effect ofthe cost change was statistically significant (F(l, 178) = 38.8; p<.OOOl) 
with high absorption rate for costs decrease and low absorption rate for costs 
mcrease. 
Discussion. 
Apparently, consumers use different standards to evaluate price fairness for 
subsidized and non-subsidized firms. The results of the study confirm our hypothesis 
about the altruistic pattern of price fairness judgments for subsidized firms, which is 
consistent with the dual entitlement principle of Kahneman et a!. (1986a). On the 
other hand, we did not find the dual entitlement pattern for non-subsidized 
companies. These results are consistent with earlier suggestions that fairness 
judgments are context specific (Dickson and Kalapurakal, 1994), and that the dual 
entitlement principle may not be the most fair under all circumstances (Kalapurakal 
et a!., 1991). In the next study we elaborated on this idea and investigated the price 
fairness judgments when additional information about the causes of the change in 
costs was provided. 
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Study 2: The effect of providing reasons for cost changes 
In Study 2, we examined whether the differences between subsidized and non-
subsidized companies could be due to differences in spontaneous inferences about 
managerial responsibility for cost changes. Public opinion about subsidized firms 
often includes inferences about their less accountable management. It is possible that 
observers reason that subsidized firms have a different management structure in 
which cost changes are external to individual managers' responsibilities. We 
compare scenarios in which no responsibility information is given with scenarios in 
which management is explicitly said to be either responsible or not responsible for 
the cost change. If differences in perceived accountability account for the difference 
between subsidized and non-subsidized firms, these manipulations should remove 
the effect obtained in Study 1. 
Three hundred ninety eight undergraduate students participated in the study. The 
procedure was identical to that of Study 1. 
Design. 
All participants were randomly assigned to the cells in 2x2x3 between subject 
design, where the factors were (1) two possible situations of changes in costs (30 
BEF decrease vs. 30 BEF increase), (2) whether the information of subsidies was 
present or not, and (3) the reasons of cost changes (one third of the subjects was told 
that the cost change was due to (smart or dumb) managerial action (internal 
responsibility), one third was told it was due to uncontrollable external circumstances 
(a tax increase), and one third was told nothing (spontaneous condition)). The later 
condition served as a pure replication of Study 1, and as a benchmark to evaluate the 
responsibility manipulation. Because Study 1 did not reveal any differences between 
the two scenarios, we only utilized the tourist service scenario. 
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Results 
********************************** 
INSERT FIG 3 ABOUT HERE 
********************************** 
The results are shown in Figure 3. They reveal that the responsibility 
manipulation had no impact on the patterns of price fairness judgments (3-way 
interaction effect F(2, 382) = 0.21; p<O. 81). The two-way interaction pattern of 
Study 1 is replicated in each of the three responsibility cells (F(1,382)=5.3; p<0.02; 
F(1,382)=7.9; p<0.005; F(1,382)=10.4; p<O.OOl; for spontaneous, external, and 
internal responsibility conditions respectively). In all three conditions the subsidized 
firms are entitled to transfer cost increases entirely, while they can keep much of the 
benefits of a cost decrease (simple effects are F(1,382)=16.8; p<O.OOl; 
F(1,382)=22.0; p<O.OOl; F(1,382)=21.3; p<O.OOl for spontaneous, external, and 
internal responsibility conditions respectively). These results are, again, consistent 
with the dual entitlement principle, regardless of managerial responsibility. The non-
subsidized firms were always subjected to a cost-plus rule, in which cost decreases as 
well as increases need to be transferred (all simple effects are F(1,382)<1). The 
responsibility manipulation only affected the absorption rates (F (1,254)=5.28; 
p<0.05). When responsibility is high, the supplier is expected to absorb more of the 
cost change. That is, the inferred responsibility for cost changes may differentiate 
between cost-plus rules with different absorption rates, but does not affect which 
price fairness principle is applied. 
Discussion. 
The striking result in this study is that subsidized firms are not held responsible 
for changes in costs, even when they are the result oftheir own bad managerial 
decisions. In all situations respondents allow the subsidized companies to 
compensate their cost increases completely (or even overcompensate it) and benefit 
from cost decreases (Table 1). 
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********************************** 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
********************************** 
Again, as in the Study 1, belief in the dual-entitlement principle seems to be very 
strong for subsidized firms while it is completely absent for profit-oriented firms. 
Even when cost increase is attributed to a dumb managerial action, the subsidized 
company is still allowed to benefit from being subsidized. In contrast, the profit-
oriented firms should always use a cost-plus pricing policy and transfer most oftheir 
cost decreases to customers, even if they are the result of good management. 
Moreover, they are never allowed to benefit from cost decreases to the same extent 
as the subsidized firms, regardless the reasons of those decreases. 
In both Studies 1 and 2 we asked respondents about their price fairness judgments 
without placing them in the role of an actual customer. This detached perspective 
reflects a situation when respondents act as observers, and their judgments reflect 
public opinion about market behavior in general. The same observer perspective has 
been used in virtually every prior fair price study. A lot has been written about the 
important role that public opinion plays in business life and its potential impact on 
the firm's profit in the long run (White and Mazur 1995; Fombrun 1996; Van Riel 
and Blackburn 1995), but it is unclear to which extent these results generalize to 
actual customer-supplier relationships. Only a few prior studies (see Piron and 
Fernandez, 1995) suggest that consumers also judge a firm' fair behavior when they 
actively participate in the exchange process as customers, and may retaliate when 
they perceive the situation as unfair. That is why we decided to put the dual 
entitlement principle to an even stronger test by examining the real-life customer 
price fairness judgments. 
Study 3: Judgment of fair price in the presence of subsidies in real-life 
conditions. 
For our field study, we chose the customers of a local student restaurant 
subsidized by the government. The restaurant serves about 2000 meals per day in six 
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city locations, most of them to university students and personnel. It offers a menu of 
dishes in five price categories (BEF 77, 100, 116, 133, and 14S). One hundred and 
twenty nine customers were intercepted at the entrance of the restaurant, and shown 
the name, list of ingredients, and current price of five meals frequently on the menu, 
one in each price category. The scenario mentioned that recently one cost 
component (ingredient costs, labor costs, or subsidies) had increased or decreased by 
10%, and subjects were asked to suggest a fair new price for each meal. 
Design 
The experiment was run as a 3x2x5 mixed factorial design. Independent variables 
were (1) three possible situations of changes in the restaurant cost structure (change 
in costs of ingredients, changes in labor costs, and changes in subsidies), (2) two 
possible directions of the cost change (10% increase, 10% decrease), and the 5 price 
levels available in the restaurant. Price level was a within subjects factor. As in the 
Studies 1 and 2 the dependent variable was the absolute difference between new fair 
price and old price for each dish. 
Results. 
********************************** 
INSERT FIG 4 ABOUT HERE 
********************************** 
The resulting price fairness judgments for ingredient costs change are presented 
on Figure 4. The three-way (current price level *type of cost change*direction of cost 
change) interaction was not significant (F(S,492)=1.0S ; p<0.37). We observed the 
same pattern of responses for the three types of cost change (F(2, 123)=0.36; p<0.69), 
and this factor is omitted from further discussion. The two-way interaction of 
current price level and direction of cost change was highly significant 
(F(4,492)=11,69; p<O.OOOI). The results show a pattern that is reminiscent of the 
dual entitlement principle only for the cheapest BEF 77 dishes. In all other cases, the 
pattern is self-serving (all p<0.05). A fair new price would be one that transfers the 
benefit of a cost decrease entirely to the customer, while the restaurant should absorb 
most of a cost increase. For four out of five dishes customers did not allow the 
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restaurant to compensate its cost increases by correspondent increase in prices. 
Moreover, to be considered fair, the restaurant should transfer almost all cost 
decreases to the customer. 
Discussion. 
The results of Study 3 suggest that the dual entitlement principle is not 
generalizable, even not when the firm is subsidized. When consumers are queried in 
their role as customers ("with their wallets in their hands"), they maintain a rather 
egoistic, self-serving view of fairness, even when the firm is obviously subsidized by 
the government and they belong to the benefited target audience. They do not allow 
the restaurant to increase prices to directly compensate the cost increase. At the 
same time almost all cost decreases should be transferred to the customer. In 
hindsight we can explain the discrepant result for the BEF 77 dish by the observation 
that the majority of students rarely buy the cheapest dish. They typically choose from 
the higher price dishes. They may allow the restaurant to increase prices for the BEF 
77 dish in order to protect the current price of their more preferred higher priced 
dishes. From this perspective, the observed pattern for BEF 77 dish also reflects 
self-interest motivation. However, in comparison with the higher-priced dishes the 
self-interest mechanism for the cheapest dish may be different. Consumers may 
allow the firm to benefit from cost decreases and compensate its cost increases for 
the cheapest dish hoping that this additional income could protect prices of their 
preferred dishes. 
In order to test the hypothesis about the impact of the long-term self-interest 
motivations we decided to investigate the role of financial incentives in price fairness 
judgments for subsidized companies in more detail. 
Study 4. The role of financial incentives in fair price judgments for 
subsidized companies 
The results of Study 3 suggested that the dual entitlement pattern of fair price 
judgments for subsidized firms may reflect concerns about long term self interest. 
When judging the focal price, consumers may accept a high absorption rate for cost 
decreases and a low absorption rate for increases because they hope that this will 
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protect their interests in the long run. The restaurant scenario in the previous study 
reflected a very specific situation in which purchases of higher priced dishes may be 
perceived as subsidizing the price of the most 'democratic' dish. In other, more 
general, situations subsidies are funded by taxes. Similar to the restaurant scenario, 
consumers may allow a subsidized firm to absorb cost decreases, and transfer 
increases to alleviate the burden they carry as tax-payers. This hypothesis was 
investigated in Study 4. 
Subjects and procedure. 
Two hundred sixty five undergraduate business students participated in the study. 
The procedure was identical to that in Studies I and 2. The subjects were asked to 
participate in a short survey related to pricing policies of companies. The 
participants received a one-page story about a zoo located in a Belgian town and 
subsidized by local taxes. The stories mentioned the current price of an entrance 
ticket, and a "best estimate" of the operational cost per visitor. Participants were 
asked to read the story carefully and suggest a new fair entrance price for the zoo, 
after its operational costs had changed. After five minutes all questionnaires were 
returned back to the administrator. 
Design. 
All participants were randomly assigned to the cells in a 2x2x2 between subject 
design. The first independent variable was the direction of the change in costs (60 
BEF increase, 60 BEF decrease). Further subjects were asked to imagine that they 
either did or did not pay local taxes that supported the zoo (as an inhabitant of the 
city). They also had to imagine that they either were or were not regular visitors of 
the Zoo. An example of the scenario is presented in Appendix B (the customer - tax 
payer - cost increase cell of the design). As in the previous studies, the dependent 
variable was the absolute difference between the current price and the new fair price. 
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Results. 
********************************** 
INSERT FIG 5 ABOUT HERE 
********************************** 
The results are presented in Figure 5, and reveal a strong three-way interaction 
between the three independent variables (F(I,257)=8.92; p<O.003). Subjects in 
taxpayer condition demonstrated a clear dual entitlement pattern (F(I,257)=22.3; 
p<O.OOOI). However, when financial incentives were eliminated (non-taxpayer 
condition) the altruism disappeared in the non-customer condition. In the customer 
condition the manipulation of financial incentives had no effect. 
Discussion. 
The results demonstrated that the financial incentives play an important role in 
individuals' price fairness judgments. When non-customers have no long-term self-
interests they tend to consider a distributive justice pattern as fair. In this situation 
their fairness judgments are based on justice norms and do not grant any benefits to 
the zoo nor to the customer. Only when their long term interests as tax payers are 
threatened, their price fairness judgments closely resembled the 'altruistic' dual 
entitlement principle. In this case they allow the zoo to compensate its cost increase 
and benefit from cost decrease in order to let the company generate additional money 
and eventually to avoid future need for subsidies. 
The results with customers are less clear. Both the taxpayer and the non-taxpayer 
groups display the dual entitlement pattern. Two potential explanations can be 
proposed. The first one is related to the used methodology. In our experimental 
setting subjects had to make their fairness judgments from a detached perspective. 
Although we chose an existing Belgian zoo, students may have had difficulties to 
imagine themselves as customers. Some previous publications in price fairness 
literature also point on the difficulties related to the manipulation of customer vs. 
non-customer factor (Kalapurakal et al. 1991). In our case the manipulation might 
not have been strong enough to find a difference in the dependent variable. The 
second explanation is more complex. It is possible that when subjects are queried in 
their role as customers of the zoo, the situation may arouse feelings of empathy for 
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the company. Regular visitors of the zoo may also be 'supporters' of the ZOOl The 
empathic motivation may overshadow the effect of the financial incentives. As a 
result, even when the financial incentives and self-interest motives are low, 
individuals may still follow the dual entitlement principle in their judgments driven 
by empathic altruistic motivation. How customers would react if their altruistic and 
utilitarian motivations are explicitly contrasted is obviously a question for further 
research. 
General discussion 
We reported four studies examining the fairness principles consumers apply to 
evaluate fair prices for government sponsored firms. We find that subsidized 
companies are subject to different price fairness rules than their profit-oriented 
counterparts. Our results are consistent with some prior suggestions that the dual 
entitlement principle in the price fairness judgments is not universal. We 
consistently find that for profit-oriented firms suggested fair prices conform to a 
cost-plus pricing policy in which most of the changes in costs are transferred to the 
customer. Subsidized firms, on the other hand, are evaluated according to the dual 
entitlement principle. They are allowed to absorb cost decreases and can transfer 
cost increases to the public (Study 1). These results are not mediated by inferences 
about managerial responsibility for the cost changes (Study 2). 
We also find that the perspective of the judge seems to influence price fairness 
judgments dramatically. When consumers evaluate price fairness 'from a distance' 
they tend to follow either altruistic (in case of subsidized companies) or distributive 
justice (for non-subsidized firms) principles for fair price judgments. However, 
when actual customers are surveyed, we found exactly the opposite: cost increases 
should be absorbed, while decreases have to be transferred. We suggest the 
possibility that results we obtained may be due to a self-serving motivation on the 
part of the respondents. 
Finally, we find that the self-serving orientation may have several sources. When 
participants are involved in a particular purchase, they display a self-serving pattern 
1 The zoo that was featured in the scenarios of study 4 actually runs "animal adoption" and other 
support programs targeted at its most frequent visitors. 
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of judgments (Study 3). However, even though individuals took a 'detached' 
perspective in Studies 1 and 2, and were not directly affected as customers, they 
might be well aware that the subsidies come from tax-payers' (that is: their own) 
money. Allowing a subsidized firm to transfer cost increases and to absorb decreases 
may be self-serving because it would reduce the need for subsidies. This hypothesis 
was confirmed in Study 4. 
The results of the studies leave important questions for future research. First, the 
results of our experiments shed some light on the nature of the dual entitlement 
principle. We argue that the observable altruism of the dual entitlement principle 
may actually be based on long-term self-interest. Individuals may allow the 
company to benefit from cost decrease and compensate cost increase only to limit 
their own private contribution to the subsidy. However, this explanation can not 
explain all our data. The discrepant results of the 'customer' condition in Study 4 
leaves room for truly altruistic principles in price judgments. The respondents may 
feel more empathy for the subsidized firm, than for the profit-oriented firm. 
Empathy feelings may foster the price fairness judgments according to the dual 
entitlement principle, rather than distributive justice or self-interest principle. 
Subsidized companies, for instance, may create an image of dependency arousing 
empathy feelings and eventually altruistic consumer behavior. 
Empathy might also be due to consumers' close identification with management 
teams of subsidized companies. Some prior results suggest that the dual entitlement 
principle applies more to small firms than to large firms, and more to individuals 
than to firms (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986a,b; Seligman and Schwartz 
1997). Consumers may perceive people working in subsidized companies as a part 
of the same "non-business" social group whose interests are related to social welfare 
rather than profit creation. Group identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986) predicts 
that members of a group seek to establish a positive group identity by favoring their 
own group members over the members of other groups in their allocation of rewards. 
Thus, the customers who closely identify themselves with the company may be more 
likely to follow the dual entitlement principle in their price judgments. Obviously the 
future research should be aimed at separating the impact of those different 
mechanisms on consumer price evaluations. 
19 
Appendix A. Study 1: the subsidized firm-cost increase-tourist ride cell of the 
design. 
Hieronder vind je een korte beschrijving van een ondememing die geconfronteerd 
wordt met een nieuwe uitdaging. Deze uitdaging kan gevolgen hebben voor het 
prijsbeleid van de ondememing. 
Jou wordt gevraagd of en hoe de onderneming nu de prijs voor haar product of dienst 
zou moeten aanpassen. Er zijn geenjuiste ofverkeerde antwoorden op deze vraag. 
Elke respondent in dit onderzoek krijgt een vraag over een verschillend scenario. 
Vul in wat volgens jou een rechtvaardige nieuwe prijs zou zijn in dit specifieke 
geval. 
Firma X verzorgt toeristische rondritten met een autotreintje doorheen het historische 
centrum van Brugge. De onderneming wordt door de overheid gesubsidieerd. De 
rondritten kosten firma X gemiddelcf 150 frank per passagier. Deze tot ale kost omvat 
alle relevante kosten: loonkost, taxen, de afschrijvingen op het rollend materieel, . 
De overheid legt 30 frank toe op elke rit. Dankzij de subsidies kost een rondrit aan 
de klant 120 frank. 
Nu blijkt dat de kosten voor Firma X met 20% zullen stijgen. De totale kost per rit 
stijgt dus van 150 frank naar 180 frank. Men moet beslissen over een rechtvaardige 
nieuwe (faire) prijs. Wat is volgens u een rechtvaardige nieuwe prijs? Roevee1 mag 
firma X na deze kostenverhoging aanrekenen? 
De rechtvaardige nieuwe prijs voor een rondrit is ....... frank (bedrag invullen). 
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Appendix B. Study 4: the customer-tax payer-cost increase cell ofthe design. 
Hieronder vind je een korte beschrijving van een ondememing die geconfronteerd 
wordt met een nieuwe uitdaging. Deze uitdaging kan gevolgen hebben voor het 
prijsbeleid van de onderneming. 
Jou wordt gevraagd of en hoe de onderneming nu de prijs voor haar product of dienst 
zou moeten aanpassen. Er zijn geenjuiste ofverkeerde antwoorden op deze vraag. 
Elke respondent in dit onderzoek krijgt een vraag over een verschillend scenario. 
Vul in wat volgens jou een rechtvaardige nieuwe prijs zou zijn in dit specifieke 
geval. 
De Belgische stad X. heeft een dierentuin die financieel gesteund wordt door het 
stadsbestuur. De subsidies komen van lokale belastingen, betaald door de inwoners 
van de stad. De dierentuin is erg populair, en zelf ben je ook een regelmatig 
bezoeker. Je woont ook in deze stad, en je betaalt er belastingen. 
Het in stand houden van de dierentuin (onderhoud, lonen, verzorging van de dieren, 
kweekprogramma's, ... ) kost behoorlijk veel geld. De gemiddelde kost per bezoeker 
is 530 frank. De stad draagt momenteel echter 100 frank per bezoeker bij, zodat de 
bezoeker maar 430 frank betaalt voor een ticket. 
Recent zijn de kosten van de dierentuin behoorlijk gestegen. Per bezoeker is de 
feitelijke kost nu gestegen van 530 naar 590 frank. De directie moet nu beslissen 
over een nieuwe prijs. Welke nieuwe prijs zou volgens jou billijk zijn? 
Een billijke nieuwe prijs voor een toegangsticket is ..... frank (bedrag invullen). 
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Direction of costs change 
Type of reason Type of company Decrease Increase 
Subsidized 17.7 32.2 
Spontaneous (0.000) (0.381) 
Non-subsidized 21 23.9 
(0.000) (0012) 
Subsidized 17.1 33.7 
External (0.000) (0.134) 
Non-subsidized 25.7 28.2 
(0.071) (0.493) 
Subsidized 13.4 29.4 
Internal (0.001) (0.811) 
Non-subsidized 22.5 22.8 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Note: The p-values of difference from 30 BEF are in parentheses. 
Table 1. Means of absolute difference between current and new fair price (Study 2) 
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